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Abstract While differentialists deny that non-linguistic animals can have a sense of
justice, assimilationists credit some animals with such an advanced moral attitude. We
approach this debate from a philosophical perspective. First, we outline the history of
the notion of justice in philosophy and how various facets of that notion play a role in
contemporary empirical investigations of justice among humans. On this basis, we
develop a scheme for the elements of justice-relevant situations and for criteria of
justice that should be fruitful in studying both humans and animals. Furthermore, we
investigate the conceptual connections between a sense of justice, on the one hand, and
various other mental powers, on the other, and indicate which of the latter may be
beyond the ken of animals. Next, we consider recent empirical research on justice-
related phenomena in animals. We argue for an intermediate position: While animals
can at least in principle satisfy some preconditions of justice (intentional action, rule-
following), others are problematic, notably possessing a notion of desert. A space for
justice in social animals exists, yet it is rather limited compared to the rich cultures of
justice in humans. Finally, we reflect on some actual or alleged implications of
research on animal justice. As regards justice in humans, one should avoid a simplistic
image of ‘‘natural justice’’ as boiling down to equal allocation of goods. As regards
justice for animals, one should be weary of the contractualist assumption that only
those capable of justice themselves are deserving of ‘‘just’’ treatment.
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Whence the Interest in ‘‘Justice’’ in Animals?
Do some animals possess anything like a ‘‘sense of justice?’’ Might there even be
animal societies in which ‘‘justice rolls down like water and righteousness like a
mighty stream’’ (Martin Luther King)? There are two opposing answers to such
questions. On the one hand, even moderate ‘‘differentialists’’ will be skeptical about
applying a complex concept like ‘‘justice,’’ which is deeply interwoven in human
social organization, including institutions like the law, to non-linguistic ‘‘beasts.’’
Thus, Aristotle influentially denied that animals have a sense of justice on the
grounds that they lack speech (Aristotle 1984a, Politics 1.2, 1253a14–18). On the
other hand, among the opposing ‘‘assimilationists,’’ some have been willing to
credit animals even with an advanced moral attitude like a sense of justice.1
Ironically, from ancient Greece down to the Middle Ages, this was sometimes
regarded as a rationale not for improving the lot of animals, but rather for punishing
them for various misdemeanors (Sorabji 1994, pp 119–121).
Differentialism is not confined to philosophy. Until about 20 years ago, most
behavioral scientists would have regarded the idea of justice among animals as an
‘‘anthropomorphic’’ projection of uniquely human characteristics onto animals.
However, the rise of cognitive ethology brought about a sea-change in favor of
assimilationism. That tendency has extended to moral attitudes like altruism and
justice (e.g., de Waal 1996). What is more, many philosophers have taken an
‘‘empirical turn’’ (Knobe and Nichols 2008; Musschenga 2005), e.g., by using
experimental methods to investigate philosophical claims. This has included moral
philosophy and has prepared the ground for an increasing interest in empirical
research on justice and other aspects of morality. Finally, this interest has included
the evolution of morality (Kitcher 2011) as well as recent research on pro-sociality,
social emotions, and justice/fairness in animals. In this context, both ethologists and
philosophers have made bold claims about the moral lives of animals in general and
‘‘wild justice’’ in particular (Bekoff and Pierce 2009). The question here is not
whether animals are objects of justice considerations, a question of animal welfare.
It is rather whether animals are subjects of moral attitudes in general and a sense of
justice in particular, and whether they can display these attitudes when interacting
with conspecifics or human care-givers. In this paper, when we write of ‘‘animal
justice,’’ we refer to the issue of justice in animals rather than that of justice for
animals.
It is not our ambition here to solve normative issues (e.g., ‘‘is the act X or the
distribution of good Y just?’’). Rather, we are concerned with the question of what
1 This useful terminology for contrasting those maintaining that the mental or moral differences between
humans and animals are qualitative and those that insist that they are merely a matter of degree derives
from Brandom (2000, pp 2–3).
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phenomena should count as part of the realm of justice and what competences are
needed for entertaining beliefs about justice and for acting in a just way. Studies of
animals have a methodological value. Finding methods for investigating animal
behaviors that may be related to justice requires analyzing these terms in a specific
way, namely with a view to developing experimental paradigms for agents2 that do
not possess human conceptual and linguistic abilities, yet nevertheless display
advanced social skills and competences. Furthermore, assessing whether there is a
legitimate notion of justice that can be applied to animal behavior is a task of
conceptual clarification, and hence within the remit of philosophy.
The philosopher’s task with respect to the study of justice in animals is threefold:
Firstly, to outline the various facets of the notion of justice (See the ‘‘Justice in
Philosophy’’ and ‘‘Assessing Justice in Human Societies’’ sections) in order to
investigate which understanding of justice may be fruitful in animal studies (See the
‘‘A Scheme for Analyzing Justice’’ and ‘‘Analyzing the Animal Justice Debate’’
sections). Secondly, to investigate the conceptual connections between justice and a
sense of justice, on the one hand, and various other mental phenomena, on the other
(See the ‘‘Justice and Mental Capacities’’ section). For, the capacity for various
dimensions of justice may presuppose other mental capacities that animals cannot
be credited with. Both tasks require conceptual analysis in a suitably liberal sense of
the label (Glock 2013) and also drawing on the history of ideas. Thirdly,
philosophers should keep in mind that animal research has a potential to change our
understanding of justice, in particular by accentuating specific aspects (e.g.,
distributive justice). It also has the potential for wider cultural effects. For example,
research on chimpanzee warfare published some years ago disseminated in the
public sphere as evidence that humans are martial ‘‘by nature’’ (Fry 2005). Research
on justice in animals may have similar effects, e.g., by promoting a specific
understanding of justice within society (reducing it to equal distribution) at the
expense of other aspects of justice.
Our contribution deals with all three aspects—the facets of the notion of justice,
the conceptual connections between a capacity for justice and other mental
capacities, and the consequences of justice research in animals for our understand-
ing of justice within society. Our focus is on the limitations of ‘‘animal justice’’
given the complexity of justice in humans. Firstly, many of the elements of justice
exist only in rudimentary forms; secondly, there are conceptual and methodological
difficulties in ascribing to animals intentional states and rules sophisticated enough
to underpin, e.g., a notion of desert. Thirdly, the experiments on inequity aversion in
animals suggest that the latter is almost exclusively self-regarding and hence does
not qualify as a genuine sense of justice.
Our contribution is structured as follows: In the following section, we will briefly
sketch the main strands of philosophical reflections on justice from a historical
perspective. In the ‘‘Assessing Justice in Human Societies’’ section, we outline some
major empirical research on humans in order to demonstrate that the complexity of
2 We use the term agent in a broad sense to apply to any creature that behaves in a purposeful manner.
For a defense of the idea that higher animals are capable of acting, and of acting for reasons, see Glock
(2009).
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the concept of justice is not an artifact of philosophical theorizing, but reflects
human social practice. These two sections serve as brief overviews for readers who
are not familiar with current discussions of justice in philosophy and psychology/
sociology. The ‘‘A Scheme for Analyzing Justice’’ section presents a conceptual
scheme that delineates the various facets of justice based on classifications in
philosophy and social psychology. Based on this scheme, we reflect on what
elements of justice-relevant situations and what criteria for considerations about
justice might be present in animal societies. In the ‘‘Justice and Mental Capacities’’
section, we discuss which mental capacities we consider as relevant to the question
of whether ‘‘justice’’ and its cognates can be applied to animal behavior, and
indicate why some of them seem beyond the ken for animals. In the ‘‘Analyzing the
Animal Justice Debate’’ section, we will review and comment on the current
research on justice in animals based on the previous analyses. Finally, in the
‘‘Broader Implications of Animal Justice Research’’ section, we briefly speculate on
the effect of research on justice in animals on the understanding of justice in modern
human society.
Justice in Philosophy
The term ‘‘justice’’ has fuzzy boundaries and is related to other important moral
terms, e.g., equality, fairness, impartiality, legitimacy, solidarity, as well as to
honesty and integrity. Sometimes, ‘‘justice’’ is treated as a synonym for ‘‘morality’’
per se. This plurality of meaning becomes intelligible given the history of the idea.
In the civilizations of the ancient Middle East, the notion of justice was very broad
and involved the idea of a ‘‘balance’’ between the metaphysical order and the
system of rules in place—a ‘‘cosmic justice’’ (Horn and Scarano 2002: Introduc-
tion). The Greek sophists of the fifth century B.C. critically assessed the ‘‘origins of
what we call just,’’ reflecting the problem of cultural relativism that emerged after
having observed that other civilizations had different moral standards. They posed a
question that resonates through the history of our topic, namely whether justice has
a ‘‘natural source’’ (physis) independent of variable human practices or whether it is
the result of a human setting (thesis), i.e., results from a specific cultural tradition.
Many Greek philosophers adopted a broad understanding of justice and regarded
it as equivalent to morality in general. Plato in the Republic treats justice as an
overarching virtue of individuals and of societies. The Greek terminus dikaiosyneˆ,
which is usually translated as ‘‘justice,’’ characterizes both the social behavior of the
individual and the moral state of the political system (Vlastos 1971). Nevertheless,
justice is mostly understood as a virtue of persons, such that a ‘‘just person’’ is
someone who wants the Good to happen, i.e., justice is treated as equivalent to
moral virtue.
An influential distinction was drawn by Aristotle. He distinguished a more
general conception of justice as a synonym for virtue (the just man being the
virtuous or good man) and a more specific conception that refers to the allocation of
goods (Aristotle 1984b, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V). The latter anticipates the
modern usage of ‘‘justice,’’ although it still refers to the virtue of a person.
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Furthermore, Aristotle distinguished two types of justice in its allocation sense:
distributive justice and retributive justice. Distributive justice concerns the specific
allocation of goods, like the partitioning of a cake and rewards for good behavior.
Retributive justice concerns compensations for any disturbance of the order of
things, notably punishment.
The modern age brought about a major shift, a focus on justice in society and
with respect to the political order rather than the virtue of individuals. At the same
time, the question persisted whether justice is an external principle that legitimates a
specific legal system, or whether justice is generated by a legal system, the
legitimation of which is founded by other principles (an analog of the Greek physis-
thesis distinction). In De Cive, Thomas Hobbes distinguished between unjustness
(iniuria) and injustice (iniusticia), where the former refers to contracts within a
specific social system and the latter to the social order as such. In Leviathan,
however, justice does not exist outside of a specified system—justice is no longer a
‘‘natural’’ property, but a property instantiated by the social order. This is an early
example of the contractualist theory of justice that was to become very important in
the philosophical discussion.
In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill related justice to two aspects: a
specified rule (maximizing the good for the greatest number of people) and a
sentiment (the will to punish someone who breaks the rule). This combination tries
to overcome the physis-thesis-distinction: Justice-related behavior involves both a
‘‘natural,’’ sentimental aspect providing a motivational force for displaying justice
(a sentimental basis that the principle of utility lacks) and a rational foundation that
allows one to deal with a large variety of justice-relevant contexts including
allocation (e.g., determining appropriate wages).
The twentieth century witnessed a reemergence of a normative understanding of
justice as a distinct moral principle. In The Concept of Law, Hart (1961) sharply
distinguished a moral and a legal understanding of justice and prioritized the former
as an instrument for criticizing particular legal systems. More seminally still, in A
Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971) claimed that, given certain preconditions (among
them, a ‘‘sense for justice’’ and a ‘‘veil of ignorance’’), humans would agree in an
ideal decision setting upon two principles of justice that include both a procedural
and a distributive component. The procedural component is contained in the first
principle of justice: ‘‘each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’’; and the second part of the
second principle: ‘‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
(b) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality
of opportunity.’’ The distributive component is contained in the first part of the
second principle (the ‘‘difference principle’’): ‘‘Social and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that (a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-
advantaged members of society.’’ In a famous passage, Rawls describes justice as
‘‘the first virtue of social institutions’’ (1971, p. 3), in a sense of virtue that is not
confined to individual agents.
The Theory of Justice focused the philosophical discussion on the distribution of
goods. As a result, at present, ‘‘justice’’ is rarely used to capture all or large parts of
morality, and most often refers to allocation problems. An important topic of debate
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is the relation between equality and justice. Prompted by Rawls’ difference
principle, some scholars require equality to be an independent component in a
definition of justice. The basic intuition that connects justice with equality is that
nobody should be worse off than others due to reasons for which he is not
responsible. This is linked to the idea of ‘‘equality of fair opportunity,’’ i.e., the
socio-economic status into which one is born should have no impact on one’s
competitive prospects. Thus, according to Gerald Cohen, the goal of justice is ‘‘to
eliminate involuntary disadvantage, (…) disadvantage for which the sufferer cannot
be held responsible, since it does not appropriately reflect choices that he has made’’
(1989, p. 916).
Out of this connection of justice with a normative impetus to create equality of
positive life chances for all humans, two strands of discussion emerged (Krebs 2000).
The first—the ‘‘Equality of What?’’-debate (Cohen 1993)—addresses the question of
what has to be equalized in order to allow equality of opportunity. The answers given
include ‘‘basic goods’’ (Rawls 1971), ‘‘resources’’ (Dworkin 1981), ‘‘welfare’’
(Roemer 1998), or ‘‘capability to function’’ (Sen 1992). This diversity reflects the
difficulty that procedural and distributive aspects of justice actually interact. For
instance, if the respective contributions of different agents are objects of justice
considerations (e.g., performance-linked pay), then different starting positions (e.g.,
education) put people in different positions with respect to the process (e.g., the well-
educated perform better). As a result, they earn more, which in turn allows their
children to become better educated and helps to promote the idea that performance-
linked pay is actually the ‘‘just’’ procedure in that specific context.
The other strand concerns the why of equality. The connection between equality
and justice has been criticized on four grounds. Firstly, justice requires a minimal
set of resources for all rather than equality with respect to resources (e.g., Frankfurt
1987). This line of critique is also skeptical about a purely relational understanding
of justice, i.e., the idea that doing justice requires a comparison between agents. For
example, if a person suffers from a disease, the justification for helping this person
is not that there are healthy agents as well (this reason would disappear if everybody
fell ill), but the fact that the disease itself is bad. Accordingly, justice does not rest
on equality, but on the fact that there are intrinsically bad conditions. Secondly,
equality may become too demanding in cases in which people are worse off due to
their own fault. Nozick (1974) maintained that, given a procedural understanding of
justice that complies with equality in opportunities, one must consider any
distribution of goods that results from procedural justice as just. Changing this
distribution cannot be justified on grounds of justice, but would require an
independent rationale. Thirdly, the idea of equality does not fit the various cultures
of justice. Walzer (1983) pointed out that there are very diverse principles of
distribution of goods that apply to different spheres of social organization, e.g., free
exchange, merits, and needs. He stressed that in arguing for distributive justice, one
has to distinguish between types of goods (e.g., money, access to education,
political functions, and medical treatment) and kinds of persons involved.
Depending on the social sphere, the significance of these goods differs and,
consequently, the distributions are valued differently. Finally, critics referred to the
enormous contingency of human life conditions, which prevent equality from being
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realizable in practice. The problem is that a multitude of factors may contribute to a
specific type of inequality and this creates the potential that many more aspects
(genetic differences, various social aspects, etc.) have to be considered from the
perspective of equality. It is thus unsurprising that empirical research like Jon
Elster’s ‘‘Local Justice Project,’’ in which the allocation principles of numerous
institutions in various countries has been investigated, reports a ‘‘bewildering
surface variety of local justice phenomena [without] underlying principles that
would bestow intelligibility on them all’’ (1992, vii). This means that the practical
difficulties of realizing equality may be insoluble.
Assessing Justice in Human Societies
Researchers in animal cognition have rarely taken their cue from philosophical
accounts of justice. Instead, they have sought to operationalize the notion of justice,
following the lead of behavioral economists and social psychologists. In doing so,
however, they have indeed relied on some of the distinctions we introduced earlier
since these empirical studies have in turn been influenced by philosophical ideas. In
order to help the reader understand the research on animal justice, we will now
sketch the pertinent features of these empirical studies of justice in humans. This
will also provide the background for our scheme for studying justice presented in
the ‘‘A Scheme for Analyzing Justice’’ section.
First, several of the basic distinctions drawn in philosophy are employed by the
empirical sciences as well. Examples are the respective roles of emotions and reason
in considerations of justice and the distinction between distributive justice (focusing
on the outcome, i.e., distribution or allocation of goods) and procedural justice
(Skitka and Crosby 2003). There are indications that people tend to care more about
procedural justice than about distributive justice (Liebig 2010). Inequalities in
distributions resulting from violating principles of distributive justice are accepted
more readily than equal distributions resulting from violations of procedural justice.
One potential explanation is that procedural justice is more closely connected to the
way one treats a person, i.e., to the respect for this person, than a resulting allocation
of goods that often refers to anonymous rules. This is of interest, as the current
research on justice in animals has an almost exclusive focus on distributive justice
(see also Skitka 2012, this issue; Brosnan and de Waal 2012, this issue).
A second observation concerns the distinction between justice as an internal and
an external principle. Empirical research demonstrates that behaviors which are
evaluated as ‘‘unjust’’ from an external perspective are sometimes regarded as
‘‘just’’ from the perspective that a specific in-group holds (Hafner and Olson 2003).
Even horrific crimes like terrorism have been committed in the name of justice. The
critique of such acts must therefore include not just to the act itself, but the whole
framework within which the act is presented as just. Similarly, one has to
distinguish the issue of which rules are seen as just from the issue whether justice is
invoked at all (Hafner and Olson 2003).
A third observation relates to various ways of making justice accessible to
experimental tests. The most important of these are behavioral games (Camerer
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2003) used to establish the existence of, e.g., inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt
1999), paradigms that have been adapted by ethologists to make them accessible for
animals (see the ‘‘Analyzing the Animal Justice Debate’’ section). The interesting
point for us is this. Even among human subjects, variations both with respect to
cultural context (Henrich et al. 2004) and to the games themselves result in
diverging verdicts on situations and allocations as ‘‘just’’ or ‘‘unjust.’’ For example,
the range of options presented to players in ultimatum games influences whether a
specific decision is considered as ‘‘just’’ or ‘‘unjust’’ (Jensen et al. 2007). Take the
mini-ultimatum game, a reduced form of the ultimatum game in which proposers
are given a choice between only two predefined offers which the responder can then
accept or reject (Bolton and Zwick 1995). In one such study, Falk and colleagues
(2003) showed that the evaluation of offers as ‘‘fair’’ was strongly dependent on the
alternatives the proposer had when making his offer. The differential rejection of
unfair outcomes across the games shown by the study suggests that people are
sensitive neither solely to unfair distributions nor solely to unfair intent (Rabin
1993), but to a combination of both (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). Subjects take into
account the range of options a social frame creates.
In the impunity game, a proposer obtains an endowment of money and decides
how to split the money between herself and another individual, the responder. The
responder has two options: either accept the offer and get his share—or reject the
offer, and the proposer gets the whole money. Even in this game, a substantial ratio
of responders reject money when the split seems unfair (Yamagishi et al. 2009, but
see Bolton and Zwick 1995). This is taken as evidence that it is not necessarily
inequity aversion that guides such choices, as rejecting the offer actually increases
inequity. Even more surprising is the result obtained in a so-called private impunity
game. In this game, the responder is advised that the proposer will not be informed
about his or her decision, ruling out the possibility that the responder’s decision
provides the proposer with information—but again, 30–40 % of the players rejected
unfair offers. Yamagishi et al. explained this as a by-product of emotion (typically
anger or disgust). Such emotions prevent a shortsighted agent from accepting an
unfair offer, an acceptance which might incur a long-term reputation loss when it
becomes known. Nothing in the experiment, however, rules out that the responder
does not want to take the responsibility for supporting unfair decisions. In this
interpretation, an unwillingness to be responsible for tolerating unfairness would be
the motivational force, as in the case of rejection the blame for unfairness is still on
the proposer. These experiments show that it is not necessarily inequity with respect
to allocations that is the object of evaluations of justice, but that the legitimacy of
the distribution is also important. They also demonstrate the leeway one has in
interpreting the results of behavioral experiments, provided that one does not have
the opportunity to ask the subjects about their motives.
More generally, behavioral games yield three insights. Firstly, behavioral
responses that are considered to be fair or unfair gain this label from the fact that the
responder knows something about the intentions the proposers had when offering a
specific allocation (e.g., whether an allocation was due to limited choice). Secondly,
the moral motives that lead to specific behavioral reactions may be complex and not
reducible to straightforward inequity aversion. Thirdly, deciding between the
Soc Just Res (2012) 25:298–326 305
123
various possible explanations that these complications raise is hard in the case of
subjects who cannot be consulted about their motives.3 These issues have to be
taken into account when behavioral games are adapted for animal research (see the
‘‘Analyzing the Animal Justice Debate’’ section).
A fourth observation concerns research on the ‘‘sense of justice’’ in humans
through neuroscientific methods (e.g., imaging, transcranial magnetic stimulation).
This research looks for connections between player behavior in economic games
and neural mechanisms that indicate involvement of basic emotional reactions.
There are various problems with linking the diverse expressions of justice (and of
other aspects of morality) in human life to specific sentiments (Christen 2010). It is
equally problematic to characterize a particular behavior as having either a
cognitive or an emotional source solely on account of which parts of the brain are
most active during the behavior (Glock 2011, pp. 11–14).
A sophisticated sociological theory of justice has been presented by Liebig
(2010). He distinguishes two types of justice: One refers to the exchange or
distribution of goods, the other refers to procedures and social interactions when
following (or violating) these procedures. With respect to the first type, he lists four
well-known justice principles: equality (everybody gets the same), equity (reward
according to contribution), desert (reward according to externally defined rights
based on, e.g., gender, nationality, or past achievements), and need (reward
according to personal requirements). The degree of legitimacy these principles can
claim tends to depend on the form of social organization in which they are applied
(Fiste 1993): In communities of common origin, the guiding principle is need; in
hierarchical organizations, it is desert; in a peer group, equality; and in markets,
equity. With respect to the second type, various principles play a role. One is
neutrality, i.e., the requirement that no one be discriminated, e.g., on grounds of race
or gender in a court of law. An important finding is that principles associated to
procedures are less context-dependent than those related to distributions and that
there is less disagreement between members of different cultures with respect to the
validity of these principles. In the following section, we partly rely on the
distinctions drawn by Liebig.
A Scheme for Analyzing Justice
Based on the philosophical and empirical considerations above, we will now outline
a basic scheme for understanding justice. We treat justice as a concept that includes
the perspectives on allocations and distributions, on procedures when creating these
distributions, and on the interactions of the agents. Two distinctions are relevant for
us.
3 Here, one has to take into account that even when subjects can be consulted about their motives, people
are often unable to accurately report their motivations. This is a problem in self-report studies, indicating
that one should be more reliant on behavioral outcomes than on self-report in both humans and other
species (Brosnan et al. 2009).
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The first refers to the elements that interact in a situation which raises questions
of justice, and which can hence become an object of justice considerations. Those
elements are (see Fig. 1):
– Agents that have certain psychological competences and needs. As mentioned in
footnote 1, we understand the term ‘‘agent’’ in a broad sense which allows for
the possibility that some non-human animals are agents.
– Resources that are regarded as either intrinsically good (e.g., food) or as
prerequisite for generating an intrinsic good. Goods can in turn become
resources for creating further goods, i.e., something is a resource relative to a
process in which the resource serves as input. Resources and agents are
interrelated by relationships of, e.g., need.
– Social organizations of different types that frame the interactions between
agents and resources. This involves, e.g., hierarchies and division of labor.
– Procedures that prescribe how agents and resources should interact when
creating a good—i.e., the normative frame of agent–agent and agent-resource
interactions within a process. This framework may have an explicit (e.g., laws)
or implicit form (e.g., traditions). It may involve access rights, guidelines, etc.
– Efforts that relate agents with agents as well as agents with resources when
creating a good, i.e., the actual behaviors, which may deviate from the behavior
prescribed by the procedures.
Preconditions
Process
Distribution
Fe
ed
ba
ck
 e
ffe
ct
s
Fig. 1 The interrelations among the elements relevant for any concept of justice concerning the
distribution of goods: The preconditions include agents (black circles) that are embedded in a social
organization (gray rectangle) and that have access to resources (hexagons). These agents form a network
by interacting in a process guided by procedures (gray rectangle with round corners) through actual
efforts (edges in the network, here represented by arrows), transforming resources into goods (stars). The
result of such a process is a distribution of these goods among the agents and of the efforts involved in
creating the goods. This distribution (shown is a distribution realizing the normative principle of equity—
the rewards correspond to the efforts) has feedback effects on all other elements (see the example in the
text for further illustration)
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– Goods that result from those processes. Note that processes that lead to the
goods and processes that lead to the distribution of these goods are conceptually
distinct, yet can de facto be entangled.
– Distributions, the relation between goods, efforts, and agents. Distributions
depend on which goods an agent possesses, has access to, etc. (this depends on
the kind of good), and what the agent’s contribution was in generating this good
(this depends on procedures and efforts).
Figure 1 illustrates the interaction of these elements. Consider the following
example. Five lumberjacks (agents) hired in a piecework agreement (social context)
go to the woods to cut down trees (resources). The most experienced lumberjack
gives the orders for when to fell each tree such that no one gets hurt (procedure).
There are various steps required to fell a tree properly—placing a saw kerf and a
dropping cut, hammering in a chock, removing branches, cutting the trunk into
smaller pieces, etc. (efforts). The lumberjacks have to interact properly in order to
produce the proper logs (goods). At the same time, their contributions vary
dramatically—in particular, one lumberjack does not participate in felling the trees
because he has had a bad day. At the end of the day, the lumberjacks have
contributed differently to the total amount of logs produced and are paid in logs
according to their contribution (distributions). Based on the result of this day’s
work, various feedback effects may influence collaboration in the future. For
example, the best trees may already have been felled (changing the resource basis),
the lumberjacks may think that it is unfair that a colleague who has had a bad day
does not get equal pay (changing the social context), or they may change their
method to optimize felling based on previous experiences (changing the procedure).
When justice in animals is the object of investigation, the possibility to identify
and analyze these elements differs: Agents (as understood here), resources (in
particular, food), social organizations (e.g., hierarchies), and efforts (i.e., the actual
behaviors) are least problematic in that respect. The notion of a good requires the
involvement of some process to create this good (collective hunting is an example).
And there are difficulties in distinguishing resources from goods in certain simple
processes. For instance, should just picking and instantaneously eating berries be
considered as a process that transforms a resource into a good? The problem is that,
unlike humans, animals in the wild engage almost exclusively in such simple
processes. Next, the notion of distributions requires both a cognitive ability to
quantify and keep track of goods (who got what?) and some durability of the good
itself (e.g., food storage). The former is difficult, though not impossible to identify
in animals (for primates see Tomasello and Call 1997, Ch. 5), and the latter is
relatively rare among cognitively advanced mammals. Finally, procedures are the
most problematic element, namely the identification of some kind of ‘‘tradition’’ or
‘‘norm’’ in animal societies with respect to justice. A procedure is more than a mere
‘‘automatic’’ behavioral reaction with respect to some specific situation (e.g., a
conspecific gets more food than the other animal, triggering an emotional reaction).
It is a rule that guides and rationalizes agents’ behavior (see next section).
Procedures should also have some degree of generalizability with respect to the
agents and resources involved (e.g., be valid for most of the group members and for
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different kinds of food). As procedures are essential to procedural justice (notably
the question of whether agents are contributing to a good in a way expected from
them), the difficulty in identifying procedures may explain why procedural justice
has rarely, if ever, been investigated in animals.
These elements are arranged as described in Fig. 1. Within this schema, four
basic levels can be distinguished: Firstly, preconditions of distributive justice, i.e.,
agents, resources, and social organization; secondly, the process that generates a
good based on the preconditions, namely through procedures and efforts; thirdly, the
distribution of goods that results from applying the process; and fourthly, the
feedback of the distribution both on the process and the precondition levels.
Feedback can affect all other elements. First, generated goods can become resources
for further processes. Next, the fact that certain goods have been allocated to a
certain agent can have immediate effects on her psychological competences (e.g.,
experiences, confidence) and change her position within the social organization.
Furthermore, it may change the procedures (i.e., if the distributed goods consist of
access rights) and the actual efforts of agents. Figure 1 thus reveals that the different
facets of justice outlined by Liebig (2010)—procedural, organizational, distribu-
tive—are closely connected.
Our second relevant distinction concerns the criteria on which judgments about
justice are based. Such criteria determine how subjects evaluate the aforementioned
elements from a normative point of view. Given the perspectives described by
Liebig (2010), the focus of evaluation can be on the distributions (distributive
justice) or on the (mis-)fits between procedures and actual efforts (procedural
justice). This evaluation does not require that the evaluating subject possesses
elaborate theories about justice. The subject must only show its potential awareness
of the parameters involved in normative evaluations. Those parameters are:
– The subject of justice concerns: Who does an agent consider to be the subject of
violations of justice? The focus can be only self-regarding (e.g., the agent only
cares about her own reward), other-regarding (e.g., the agent cares when
another agent is treated unfairly), in-group (e.g., a group reserves justice
considerations for its own members), and out-group (a group considers justice
with respect to outsiders).
– The object of justice concerns: This refers to the accessibility of the elements of
justice to the agents. Agents must possess certain cognitive capabilities in order
to realize that a norm of justice is violated. The distributive focus is the least
demanding, whereas a procedural focus requires sophisticated competences,
e.g., for accepting abstract values.
– The variability of justice concerns: This refers to the number of criteria used in a
judgment about justice. One may have only one criterion that is applied to all
social situations (e.g., everybody gets the same) or one may have many criteria
as well as conditions that determine which criteria are applied in which
situations (e.g., along the typology proposed by Fiste 1993). Again, the more
criteria are employed, the higher are the requirements with respect to the
cognitive capabilities of the agents.
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– Expression of justice concerns: This refers to the way a concern for justice is
manifested by an agent toward other agents. The behavioral manifestation may
be very limited, e.g., allowing only showing displeasure in the face of inequity.
At the other end of the spectrum would be language-based reasoning and
argumentation for specific justice concerns.
Animals are obviously unable to make use of the whole spectrum of possibilities
these four parameters of judgments about justice offer. And we have already noted
that there are limits to the degree to which the elements of our scheme are
implemented in animal societies. Therefore, the question raised by our schema for
justice is: to what extent are animals able to fulfill its elements and how much of the
spectrum the parameters of justice concerns offer can they satisfy?4
Justice and Mental Capacities
Before tackling that question with a view to specific empirical research conducted
over the last few years, some fundamental philosophical issues need to be
mentioned. These concern the conceptual connections between a sense of justice, on
the one hand, and cognitive and conative mental capacities, on the other.
Let us first note that some contributions to the debate about justice in animals
employ ‘‘justice’’ in the older and more general sense of referring to morality as
such (notably Bekoff and Pierce 2009; see also Pierce and Bekoff 2012, previous
issue). Quite independently of this usage, ‘‘fairness’’ rather than ‘‘justice’’ seems to
be the term most often used in animal research. This may be due to a largely implicit
tendency to regard justice as a more demanding and diffuse phenomenon compared
to less demanding and more tractable phenomena like fairness or inequity. Note that
there are different ways in which justice could and has been contrasted with
fairness. Firstly, there is the distinction between more or less complex phenomena:
Justice might be held to be the more inclusive phenomenon (e.g., involving all the
features outlined in our scheme), while fairness only encompasses a selection. Then,
there is the distinction between justice as an objective social phenomenon and
fairness as a feeling or reaction on the part of agents. And finally, one can
distinguish two such reactions—a sense of justice which is more reflective,
cognitive, and cultural, and a sense of fairness which is more spontaneous, affective,
and natural. Thus, some psychologists distinguish between a ‘‘sense of fairness,’’
which is a spontaneous sentimental reaction and a ‘‘sense of justice,’’ which is a
more elaborate and well-considered response that results from moral expertise
(Narvaez and Lapsley 2005). This may help to keep apart behavioral reactions that
emerge rather spontaneously and may often be considered as ‘‘unfair/-just’’ from
those emerging from a ‘‘sense of justice.’’ The latter is supposed to be more reliable
in producing the ‘‘ethically right’’ answer and it is linked to a complex social frame
in which human subjects are trained and cultivated. In a similar vein, Rawls
4 Note that variants of this question arise independently of accepting our scheme as whole. For, at least
some of the elements and parameters we identify undoubtedly play a role both in standard concepts of
justice and in justice-related phenomena.
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described the sense of justice as a motivational force that develops after just
institutions have been introduced (see also Scarano 1998). Note that these ‘‘senses’’
are not equivalent to the ability to actually behave in a just manner. One may react
to something as unfair or unjust without being able to do something about it, e.g.,
because of weakness of will. These senses are psychological dispositions or
competences the agents have—the former is more affective and supposed to have
more ancient phylogenetic roots, while the latter is more reflective and primarily
rooted in the cultural history of a group or society.
In any event, it is generally recognized that both (a sense of) justice and (a sense
of) fairness require more than pro-social behavior of the kind on display, e.g., in
insect societies. The pro-social behavior must also be intelligent, i.e., flexible and
plastic (see Bekoff and Pierce 2009, pp. 12–13). There is an underlying rationale for
this requirement. As in the case of genuine altruism, pro-social behavior acquires
the moral significance attached to justice only if it is intentional in the sense of
being explicable by reference to the agent’s goals or reasons, to what she believes,
desires, intends, etc. Die-hard differentialists notwithstanding, there are no grounds
for denying that non-linguistic animals can have beliefs and desires; and it is
arguable that they are capable of acting not only in pursuit of goals, but also for
reasons, i.e., in the light of how things are or appear to be.
The moot question is what types of beliefs and desires can be attributed in the
absence of language. Here, the specter of indeterminacy raises its ugly head. Barring
the option of asking the subject about its reasons or motives, it may be impossible to
distinguish reasons of any but the most fundamental type. There may be no way in
principle for determining whether a pro-social action was performed, e.g., for the
reason that the beneficiary is in need and deserving of help, or for the reason that the
beneficiary will (feel obliged to) reciprocate, or for no genuine reason at all but, e.g.,
out of a diffuse empathetic tendency. And without ways of deciding between such
alternatives, talk of reasons may lose its grip altogether; at any rate, it is not
operational in the way required for empirical research.
Another problem concerns the space for deliberation or reasoning. It is clear
enough that intelligent animals chose between different options. But can they be
said to make decisions based on considering and weighing their options? Finally,
there is the role of the will for moral agency and moral powers in general and for
justice in particular. We normally accord praise or blame to humans on the
assumption that they have deliberately chosen a particular course of action or could
at least have refrained from it. This does not presuppose freedom of will in the
spurious sense of an unconditioned, uncaused volition. But it may presuppose that
subjects be capable of manifesting a moment of decision and/or that their actions are
under their control in accordance with their reasons. And it is contentious whether
animals possess these powers (for more on these issues see Glock 2009).
Returning to the types of beliefs and desires that animals can be credited with, the
crucial question is precisely which of those required for a sense of justice or fairness
they include. One prominent issue here, as in the case of altruism, is whether
animals are capable of entertaining beliefs, desires, and intentions about the beliefs,
desires, and intentions of others. As mentioned in the ‘‘Assessing Justice in Human
Societies’’ section, when human participants in behavioral games react to an action
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by other players as fair or unfair, this is often based on beliefs about the intentions of
these other players. Furthermore, the capacity for beliefs about the beliefs and
desires of others is a precondition for most, if not all, beliefs about what these others
deserve in a certain situation. Such beliefs often presuppose beliefs about the
behavior of others being worthy of praise or blame. And the latter beliefs in turn
standardly presuppose beliefs about the motives or intentions behind the behavior.
Even leaving the aforementioned issue of deliberate choice aside, we accord praise
or blame differently to intentional and unintentional behavior. And even when we
blame a subject on grounds of culpable negligence rather than malign intentions, we
rely on beliefs about what the subject knows or could have known. Finally, a belief
to the effect that a subject deserves a certain treatment by way of reward or
punishment cannot be independent of beliefs about what that subject desires or
resents.
Accordingly, there are important dimensions of justice considerations that are
foreclosed to subjects lacking the capacity for entertaining beliefs, desires, and
intentions about the beliefs, desires, and intentions of others. This capacity is often
referred to as possession of a ‘‘theory of mind.’’ Yet, no ability for genuine theory
construction is required even in the case of humans, which is why the increasingly
popular label ‘‘mind reading’’ is to be preferred (see Bermu´dez 2009; Hurley and
Nudds 2006, 429n). Nevertheless, whether even the most intelligent animals are
‘‘mind readers’’ rather than mere ‘‘behavior readers’’ is a contested issue within
cognitive ethology (cp. Tomasello and Call 2006; Povinelli and Vonk 2006). In our
view, this contrast may be overdone. Intentions, for instance, are often manifest in
behavior, with the consequence that reading behavior often is reading intentions.
But it is nonetheless a philosophically and empirically vexed issue whether animals
can entertain beliefs, e.g., about the intentions and desires (subjectively felt needs)
of others.
Even assuming that precondition to be fulfilled, further difficulties arise when it
comes to the moral, non-egoistic dimension of justice considerations implied by the
notion of desert. How is one to decide between animal 1 believing that animal 2
deserves a certain treatment rather than believing that meeting out the treatment will
have positive consequences for animal 1?
These challenges are connected to the theme of rules or norms. Rules are
essential to what we have called procedures. And even among assimilationists,
many recognize that they are indispensable to morality in general and justice in
particular (see Bekoff and Pierce 2009, pp. 115–116, 121). But it is imperative to get
clear about what is involved in rules and rule-following. In what follows, we adopt a
perspective on normative phenomena that ultimately derives from Wittgenstein and
has been hotly debated in contemporary philosophy in the wake of Kripke (1982)
and Brandom (e.g., 2000).5 First and foremost, rules are standards against which
5 Our specific version is particularly indebted to von Wright (1963), Hart (1961), Baker and Hacker
(1984), and Searle (1997). Although it has a different aim (namely to elucidate the conceptual
connections between normative phenomena, language, and thought rather than to explain the emergence
and stability of social rules in human societies), the Wittgensteinian conception is congenial in many
respects to the influential account of social norms developed by Bicchieri (e.g., 2006). It distinguishes
between rules and rule-guided behavior, while insisting that rules must at some level be embodied in
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something (notably behavior) can be assessed as correct or incorrect. They have a
world-to-mind direction of fit. By contrast to an expectation, if a rule is violated, it
is the world (behavior) that needs to be brought in line rather than the rule. If planets
turn out to follow paths other than elliptical ones, it is Kepler’s Laws—a theoretical
belief—rather than the movement of the planets which need revision. By contrast, if
I drive on the left-hand side, it is my driving rather than the Traffic Code which is at
fault.
Secondly, rules provide reasons for action. Although rule-following presupposes
regularity in behavior, there is a difference between following a rule and merely
acting in accordance with a rule. If an agent follows a rule in Uing, the rule must be
part of her reason for Uing, and more specifically for Uing in a particular manner.6
This once again draws in its wake a requirement that the behavior be intentional. If
an animal merely has a disposition, e.g., to share food with conspecifics without
intending to do so, it will not be following a rule. And this holds even if the
responses that manifest the disposition are ‘‘correct’’ in the sense of being adaptive.
Thirdly, rules are inherently general, by contrast to normatively loaded expectations
about a specific situation such as the expectations behind commands. Although rules
are commonly restricted to certain subjects, they govern an unlimited multiplicity of
occasions.
These three points pose challenges to the idea that animals can follow rules.
These arise from the fact that animals are incapable not only of justifying their
behavior by reference to rules, but also of recognizing the formulations of the rules
they are purported to follow. Ironically, however, these challenges may be
weakened rather than strengthened by the fact that the rules involved in justice must
satisfy an additional condition, namely being social, in force within a community or
group. In a community C, a behavioral regularity R is a shared rule if and only if it
satisfies three additional requirements, to wit: fourthly, it is rare for members of C
to deviate from R; fifthly, if members of C deviate from R, they are subject to
sanctions; sixthly, these sanctions are generally accepted by members of C. The
communal interactions of requirements four and five can indicate the world-to-mind
fit (requirement 1) and the difference between a rule and a regularity (requirement
2), which might otherwise be difficult to ascertain in a non-linguistic creature S. The
Uing of S can be norm-sensitive—correct or incorrect—in the sense of being
approved or disapproved by other members of the community. S’s intention of
following the rule to U can be manifested in S’s reacting to the approval or
disapproval in combination with S’s in turn approving or disapproving Uing by
Footnote 5 continued
behavior, though this need not consist in compliance with the rule. It also denies that only behavior
accompanied by conscious deliberation or consultation of rules can count as rule-guided. By contrast to
the Chomskian conception of syntactic rules, however, it insists that subjects must at least be capable of
recognizing suitable formulations of the rules they are following, since otherwise the all-important
difference between following a rule and merely acting in accordance with a rule is lost (see Baker and
Hacker 1984: Chs. 8–9; Searle 1997 and Glock 2012a).
6 As the antecedent makes clear, the claim that rules provide reasons for actions does not imply that
subjects have reasons to follow any given rule independently of their intentions, e.g., even when they
repudiate that rule.
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these other members. All that is required is the possibility to distinguish mere
surprise from disapproval among the members of this non-linguistic community.
Accordingly, there are no compelling grounds for denying that animals can
follow communal rules in general (see Glock 2010, pp. 91–96). As regards justice in
particular, at least one difficulty remains nonetheless. Because of requirement 2,
animals can follow a rule only if they have some kind of understanding of that rule.
Causes of our behavior that we are completely and irredeemably ignorant of cannot
be reasons for us and hence cannot be rules in the sense employed here (see fn. 5).
The fundamental conceptual and methodological hurdle for animals this poses is the
following. The kinds of rules implicated in justice are complex, involving the
aforementioned mind-reading and moral dimensions, especially through the notion
of desert. It is the content of a particular type of rule that may demand too much
from animals, not normativity per se.
Many assimilationists dismiss philosophical qualms about animal minds in
general and animal justice in particular by a reference to principles of biological
continuity (e.g., Bekoff and Pierce 2009, xi, 113, 137). Since we are no less a
product of evolution than other primates, the reasoning goes, there cannot be any
substantial differences between them and us. However, continuity along individual
lineages of evolutionary development has no implications for the mental capacities
of the animals around us. Saltationism notwithstanding, it is probable that our
closest evolutionary ancestors shared many of our other mental capacities. Yet,
these ancestors are extinct; and there is no guarantee that the biologically closest
extant species—our nearest relatives—are mentally close to us. If all vertebrates
except homo sapiens had been vanquished by a wayward meteorite, it would be
absurd to conclude that starfish and sea cucumbers must be mentally close to us and
hence share our sense of fairness or justice.
Analyzing the Animal Justice Debate
We now return to our question: To what extent does animal behavior actually display
aspects of the complex phenomena and cultures of justice we encounter in humans,
or simpler variants of these elements (see also Brosnan 2011a)? More specifically,
keeping in mind the conceptual and methodological issues broached in the ‘‘Justice
and Mental Capacities’’ section, we will explore how animal behavior recorded and
investigated in recent ethological research can be related to the distinctions (elements
of justice, normative criteria in justice concerns) drawn in the ‘‘A Scheme for
Analyzing Justice’’ section. While we cannot speculate on the evolutionary roots of
the sense of justice here, our exercise should also help to prepare the ground for
deciding which simpler variants may have been precursors of justice in humans.
Before we start, we review and comment on the major types of experiments7
done so far and provide some examples. The research we report was done with
7 We disregard observational studies of animals in the wild and in captivity, even though they are still a
major source of much research on pro-social behavior. We also disregard the interesting research on
fairness in social play among mammals (see Bekoff and Pierce 2009, Ch. 5).
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primates, although there are few studies on non-primates (e.g., dogs; Range et al.
2009). Most of the primate experiments were follow-up studies after Brosnan and de
Waal (2003) and Brosnan et al. (2005) claimed to have found a negative reaction to
inequity (defined as unequal outcomes). Those studies are discussed in more detail
in other contributions to the special issues of Social Justice Research (see Price and
Brosnan 2012, previous issue; Range et al. 2012, previous issue; Horowitz 2012,
previous issue; Bra¨uer and Hanus 2012, this issue; Yamamoto and Takimoto 2012,
this issue). Therefore, we only outline the experimental paradigms and provide
references for further details. We classify these studies into three groups.
Inequity Experiments—Animal–Human Without Task
This setting is characterized by a human treating two animals differently with respect
to the distribution of goods, such that the subjects witness ‘‘inequality.’’ The
inequality lies in receiving food that is more or less preferred, and the rewards are not
based on differences in the prior behavior. The aim of the experiments is to find out
whether the animal reacts to this observed difference. The behavioral reactions
employed to measure such a sensibility include rejection of the good and latencies in
taking the good. There is no animal–animal interaction beside mutual observation
and the possibility to display, e.g., begging behavior, although in some settings, the
animals are physically close allowing, e.g., one animal to take the food the other
animal has rejected. The human-animal interaction consists in handing over food; the
animal only needs to grasp food, which is considered an ‘‘effortless’’ condition.
Various controls are included: the absence of a witness, the visibility of food, the type
of food, and the hierarchical relations of the animals in the group. An example of
such a study is Bra¨uer et al. (2009). They used a 2 9 2 factor design (the presence or
absence of the competitor in a second cage, handing over low- or high-value food)
and tested for various control conditions (the presence or absence of food, different
places of the animals in the social hierarchy, the presence of a frustration effect,
different species—orangutans, gorillas, bonobos, chimpanzees). They were not able
to replicate the ‘‘inequity aversion’’ behavior found by Brosnan et al. (2005). The
latter found that chimpanzees showed increased levels of rejection for less-preferred
food when competitors received better food than themselves for completing a task.
By contrast, the apes of Bra¨uer et al. ignored fewer food pieces and stayed longer at
the testing station when a conspecific got favored food. Moreover, the subject begged
more when the competitor was present than when she was absent; chimpanzees, in
particular, also begged more when the conspecific got favored food. These results are
the opposite to those of Brosnan et al. (2005), as subjects ignored food less rather
than more when the competitor received food of higher quality than they themselves
did. Bra¨uer et al. concluded that if food refusals are the key to inferring inequity
aversion, then the apes in their study were not inequity averse.
Inequity Experiments—Animal–Human with Task
This setting adds to the previous one, namely a task the animal has to fulfill (e.g.,
exchanging a token) in order to get food. It includes what we call a procedural
Soc Just Res (2012) 25:298–326 315
123
element (effort) and tests whether the animal is actually sensible to differences in
effort. These tasks are embedded in human–animal interactions and not in animal–
animal interactions.
The first study using this approach was published by Brosnan and de Waal
(2003). Two animals exchanged a token for food (either preferred—grape; or less
preferred—cucumber); the behavior of animal 2 is the observable. In the ‘‘equality
condition,’’ both animals obtain cucumbers for their tokens. Compared to this
condition, animal 2 exchanged a token for a cucumber less often when animal 1 got
grapes for the token (inequality condition), got the grape for free (effort control), or
before the exchange grapes were given for free to animal 2 in the absence of animal
1 (food control). The fraction of non-exchanges increased over time for the
inequality condition and the effort control, but decreased for the food control. Taken
together, these results were interpreted as evincing inequity aversion: Animals
refused to participate in an exchange task if a conspecific got more for performing
the same task or even for not performing a task at all.
This study and a follow-up study with chimpanzees (Brosnan et al. 2005) were
criticized by various scholars. Thus, it has been claimed that the mere presence of
better food caused the rejection of the less-preferred food (Wynne 2004; Dubreuil
et al. 2006) due to frustration effects (Silberberg et al. 2009), that the behavior
cannot be called inequity aversion as rejecting food actually increases inequity
(Henrich 2004), and that there was no similar reaction in situations that should
equally trigger such a response (Bra¨uer et al. 2006, 2009; Jensen et al. 2006, 2007;
for a summary, see Bra¨uer and Hanus 2012, this issue). In follow-up experiments
using the same experimental paradigm (e.g., van Wolkentet et al. 2007; Brosnan
et al. 2010), some of the criticisms were addressed. Firstly, several controls show
that while the subjects respond aversely when a partner receives better food, they do
not respond aversely when better food is simply available to the partner. This may
indeed rule out the possibility of a frustration effect, but it is compatible with a
social emotion like envy (see below).
Secondly, it seems that the inequity response is a function of the effort. When the
effort is substantial enough, the animals are more inclined to accept even a lower
(i.e., inequitable) reward. However, the overview in Brosnan et al. (2010) reveals a
rather complex pattern of inequity aversion in chimpanzees. The presence of a task
seems to be important, though not in all studies (Bra¨uer et al. 2009); males show
more inequity aversion (i.e., they refused more often to complete the interaction
with the experimenter when the partner received a better outcome), and there are
indications of ‘‘prosocial’’ rejections by the animal that benefits: Chimpanzees were
more likely to refuse a high-value grape when the other chimpanzee got a lower
value carrot than when the other chimpanzee also received a grape. It would appear
that there are substantial differences between chimpanzee populations with respect
to inequity aversion, yet given the indeterminacy in interpreting the motives of non-
linguistic subjects, the reasons are difficult to fathom (see Price and Brosnan 2012,
previous issue).
It is important to note one general limitation of this experimental setup. It
assumes that animal 2 compares the relation between its own effort and its own
good to the relation between the effort of animal 1 and the good it receives. But it
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cannot capture differences between kinds of processes that can lead to such
differences. Contrast a lottery in which person 2 exchanges money for a lottery
ticket that involves either a high or a low reward. Seeing person 1 getting a higher
reward for the same investment would not be considered a violation of justice in a
human context by contrast to a scenario in which person 2 has to pay a higher price
for the lottery ticket. The feeling of disappointment in person 2 who got a low
reward for his ticket is rather a frustration effect, even though it may induce person
2 to refuse the lottery reward.
Inequity Experiments—Animal–Animal with Task
These experiments eliminate the animal–human interaction and replace it with an
animal–animal interaction, i.e., animal 1 has the option to offer different
distributions of goods (usually food) to animal 2 (an act that involves a task), and
animal 2 has the option of reacting to this offer. These experiments seek to adapt
behavioral games played with humans (e.g., impunity, dictator, or ultimatum game)
to animals. The inequality usually consists of quantitative differences (i.e., the same
food yet different amounts). The effort at issue depends on the experimental
paradigm. Either only one animal has to perform a task or both have to; in the latter
case, the two tasks are interrelated so as to constitute collaboration. The behavior of
both animal 1 and 2 can be objects of the investigation. In animal 1, one can observe
whether its choices benefits animal 2 as well, whereas in animal 2, one can observe
its reaction (rejecting food, begging behavior, performing a specific task required
for obtaining the food). In some experiments, one can vary the tasks involved and
thus make effort an observable as well. For instance, one can compare a situation in
which the difference in efforts of the two animals is small to a situation in which one
animal contributes much more in the collaboration than the other animal. But one
has to keep in mind that combining differences in effort with differences in
evaluation of outcome is tricky. Motivation research in humans shows that the
involvement of effort increases the probability that an outcome that is normally less
valued is valued more. This effect also seems to play a role in animal experiments
involving the valuation of efforts and outcomes (Neiworth et al. 2009).
An example of a study focusing on animal 1 is Fletcher (2008). A variant of the
dictator game is played by capuchin monkeys, i.e., a chooser decides between two
distributions of goods for him and a second receiver. Capuchin subjects were given
two choices that had the same payoff for the chooser (one piece of food), but were
either equitable (animal 2 receives one piece) or inequitable (animal 2 receives three
pieces). The results showed a tendency of inequity aversion: The choosers more
often selected an equal distribution of food. An example of a study focusing on both
animals (chimpanzees) is Jensen et al. (2007). They used a mini-ultimatum game in
which the proposer chooses between two preset offers which the responder can then
accept or reject. The results showed that (i) responders tended to accept any offer; in
particular, they did not reject unfair offers when the proposer had the option of
making a fair offer; (ii) proposers did not appear to take outcomes affecting the
responder into account. Interestingly, even when the proposer offered no food at all
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to the respondent, the latter allowed the proposer to get the full share in 56 % of the
cases (see also Smith and Silberberg 2010).
Finally, Takimoto and Fujita (2011) conducted an experiment in which the tasks
varied in order to test the sensitivity of capuchin monkeys to the labor contributed
by conspecifics. An operator monkey pulled the drawer of one of two food
containers placed between two monkeys, each containing a food for the operator
and another for a recipient monkey. The recipient received either high- or low-value
food depending on the operator’s choice, whereas the operator obtained the same
food regardless. In the unequal labor condition, the operator had to perform two
actions to obtain food (pull the handle of the board to which the containers were
glued; release food by pulling the drawer of one of the containers), whereas in the
equal labor condition, the first action was performed by the recipient. The tasks were
sequenced as follows: first, an unequal labor condition; second, an equal labor
condition; and third, again an unequal labor condition. This allowed subjects to
distinguish the third condition—i.e., the second with unequal labor—from the first.
Potential ‘‘unfairness’’ (the recipient gets food without working) was highlighted in
that third condition (the third overall) as the recipient had cooperated beforehand in
the second, i.e., equal, condition. However, one aspect of human justice is not
fulfilled in such a setting: The unequal labor condition did not allow any choice to
refuse collaboration by the recipient. We therefore would not say that the responder
has acted ‘‘unjustly’’, as the context did not allow justice. The result showed two
things: Firstly, only in the equal labor condition did operators chose the high-value
food container for recipients more often than when the recipient was absent.
Secondly, the receiver showed significantly less begging behavior in the second
unequal labor condition. This suggests that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to the
labor of others. For one thing, the operator gave more food to a partner who had
helped them to complete a task. For another, the recipient showed less frustration in
the final condition, i.e., the second condition with unequal labor distribution, in
which the contrast between cooperation and not cooperating was enhanced
compared to the first unequal labor condition, perhaps because the recipient was
able to cooperate in the trial before. There was, however, no significant behavior
that could be related to inequity aversion, i.e., in the second unequal labor condition;
the operator did not ‘‘punish’’ the non-cooperator by giving him the low-value food
more frequently.
We will now further evaluate this research by applying our scheme of the ‘‘A
Scheme for Analyzing Justice’’ section. We start with the elements of justice and
their potential implementation in animal societies:
– Agents: The agents under consideration (i.e., primates) possess basic cognitive
and conative abilities: they recognize and evaluate the behavior of conspecifics
and value different food more or less. As outlined in the ‘‘Justice and Mental
Capacities’’ section, there are no grounds for denying that non-linguistic animals
can have beliefs and desires; and it is arguable that they are capable of acting for
reasons (see fn. 2 and the ‘‘Justice and Mental Capacities’’ section above).
– Resources: Almost all studies involve food as the main resource, even though
other resources (e.g., access to mating partners, territory) could also be
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investigated. The reason is that food experiments are relatively simple to set up:
Animals like to eat almost irrespective of circumstances, the behaviors
associated with food (grasping, finding, problem solving, etc.) are relatively
simple, and inequality can easily be measured.
– Social organizations: Due to the hierarchical nature of most primate societies
and the often extreme imbalances in power, distributive justice will almost
certainly not amount to equality (Brosnan 2006). Equity in a group of animals
may boil down to a balance in which dominants get the lion’s share, while
making membership of the group attractive enough so that subordinates do not
abandon the group. It is therefore remarkable that experiments have in many
cases failed to detect a distribution pattern that benefits dominant individuals
(e.g., Takimoto et al. 2010; but see Brosnan et al. 2010, and Bra¨uer et al. 2009).
This may indicate that the experimental settings are somehow artificial by
comparison to the interaction patterns of the animals in the wild, which may
weaken their significance and explanatory power.
– Procedures: We have already commented on the complex preconditions of rule-
following in general and of following rules of justice in particular. But there is
also a factual limitation to animal justice. There appears little evidence from
either the wild or captivity that primate communities, at least, enforce any kind
of distributive rules on a third-party basis. The closest one seems to get is third-
party mediation in communal fights (e.g., de Waal 1996), which is an aspect of
organizational interaction justice in the scheme we adapted from Liebig.
Siblicide and infanticide are other examples of ‘‘anti-social’’ behavior that
causes distress for individuals, but which is not sanctioned by third-parties
within primate communities. The relative absence of the social enforcement of
‘‘moral rules’’ in primates reflects a more general fact. The interaction among
those primates that are cognitively closest to us is significantly less cooperative
than it is among humans (Tomasello 2009), perhaps because they are not
cooperative breeders (Burkart and van Schaik 2010). We should also note that
even if there is an ‘‘internal’’ sense of justice among animals, i.e., established
patterns of distribution, there is no obvious external perspective, no questioning
of the principles of justice in force in a particular group.
– Efforts: As regard efforts, they are basic, yet can involve both animal-human
(token exchange) and animal–animal interactions (pulling ropes). The social
interactions that the experiments permit are, however, highly restricted. In many
experiments, the only interaction among conspecifics is watching the behavior
of each other and begging behavior. In some experiments, one animal can take
food away from the other animal if the latter refuses eating it. There are
indications that animals show sensitivity to efforts. But as indicated above, this
sensitivity seems to not be a very stable phenomenon, i.e., it seems to vary
between groups of the same species, depend on gender and the type of effort,
etc.
– Goods: As the resource used is food, the function of transforming it into a good
is simple: the validation of the food as more or less preferred on account of
either quality or quantity. This is a rather simple kind of a good, in particular, as
food storage or any kind of food processing seems to be very rare (an example is
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given Marriott and Salzen 1979), possibly because there is no opportunity for
storage (Brosnan 2011b).
– Distribution of goods: There are two types of inequality investigated in the
experiments: inequality with respect to food validation and inequality with
respect to effort involved. But whether the animals are sensitive to inequalities
in distribution of goods and/or efforts necessary to obtain food is not so clear
given the data available so far. This sensitivity seems to depend on various
aspects (gender, species, and design of the experiment; see Price and Brosnan
2012, previous issue).
With respect to the dimensions of justice concerns, the experiments once more
demonstrate only very basic variants:
Subject of Justice Concerns
In almost all studies, the subject of justice concerns is the agent himself, in
particular with respect to disadvantages. This means that animals have a sensibility
to situations in which they themselves are disadvantaged—in particular with respect
to food distributions, but less with respect to inequalities in effort. In exchange
experiments, there is very little indication of inequity aversion on the side of the
proposer (Brosnan et al. 2010).
Assimilationists interpret these results as showing that of two types of inequity
aversion, only one is present, namely to others receiving more, while there is little to
no aversion to receiving for oneself more than others. But the question arises
whether the first type actually instantiates a sense of fairness at all rather than a
sense of greed or, more appositely, envy. Assimilationists have responded to this
challenge by maintaining that both are counterparts to justice: You only feel envious
because you feel shortchanged (Bekoff and Pierce 2009, pp. 127–128). However, in
the absence of the second type of inequity aversion, feeling shortchanged does not
evince a sense of fairness. Assimilationists speak of a sense of ‘‘indignation’’ here
(Brosnan and de Waal 2003). But how precisely is indignation to be distinguished
from envy in the absence of language or facial expressions of a human kind?8 And
without something like indignation, exclusively egoistic inequity aversion does not
amount to righteousness. It does not even amount to an exclusively self-serving
feeling that one has not received one’s due share. For, even such a one-sided ‘‘self-
righteous’’ feeling presupposes that the subject can recognize that the rules of
distribution apply equally to others, and that it could be these others who have not
received their fair share. In the absence of indignation, equity aversion is neither
righteous nor self-righteous, it is simply not part of the realm of righteousness. By
the same token, inequity aversion without an other-regarding sense of equity is not
a special kind of ‘‘primate’’ distributive justice as some would have it; it is simply
Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.
8 As Brosnan remarks (see Introduction to this special issue), it is remarkable that even experiments with
humans rarely include actual controls for envy.
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Objects of Justice Concerns
In the experiments done so far, only elements that are directly accessible to the
animal have been investigated, namely food inequality and effort inequality (effort
related to obtaining food). So far, there are no indications that social organizations
affect the behavior in a clear and consistent way.
Variability
Due to scarcity of reliable, non-anecdotal data, there is currently no indication
whether animals show any sensitivity or variability with respect to anything one
might call principles or rules of justice. In principle, all four candidate principles
could be investigated: Need (e.g., in case of scarcity: Do social animals provide
most of the food available to those who starve the most?), equality (e.g., when a
food source is found: Does everybody get the same amount?), equity (e.g., In
collective hunting, does the animal who did most of the work get most of the prey?),
and desert (e.g., does the most dominant animal always get most of the food?).
However, the measurement problems involved in investigating these scenarios are
much more severe than in humans (i.e., whether the animals are able to discriminate
different social situations and relate them to different principles) and there seem to
be very few indications that any ‘‘principle of justice’’ is reliably displayed across
social situations.
Expression
Most expressions of inequity aversion are of a type that is both affective and
negative. Paradigmatically, an animal ‘‘complains’’ when it gets less than the others
(see also above, ‘‘subject of justice concerns’’). It would be interesting to establish
whether there are more complex patterns among animals when distribution
problems arise, e.g., positive encouragement of sharing or a concern for others
getting a fair share. But the difficulties of dealing with non-linguistic subjects are
hard to overcome when investigating this issue.
All things considered, we conclude that the ‘‘space for justice’’ is rather limited
even for animals that display a complex social life and that we consider to be able to
act intentionally or for reasons. The main problem is that justice in a familiar sense
involves elements and aspects that are present in the rich human cultures of justice,
yet either absent or rudimentary in animal societies. And this is partly because
important features of a sense of justice require mental capacities that are difficult to
credit animals with (See the ‘‘A Scheme for Analyzing Justice’’ and ‘‘Justice and
Mental Capacities’’ sections). If justice is narrowed down to an emotional reaction
in well-specified and restricted distributional settings, behaviors indicating inequity
aversion are discernible. Yet, they are mainly self-regarding, and hence one cannot
speak of a genuine sense of justice or fairness (see the ‘‘Analyzing the Animal
Justice Debate’’ section).
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Broader Implications of Animal Justice Research
Research on social norms and morality in animals is predominantly undertaken
within an evolutionary framework: One expects to ‘‘understand’’ human sociality
and morality by speculating about its evolutionary origins, and comparisons with
extant animals are supposed to support these evolutionary hypotheses. Such
research may indicate which kinds of situations may have been selected for
(attention to distributions) and which emotions are involved in the phylogenesis of a
sense of justice. Furthermore, studies of justice in animals have a methodological
value as they require analyzing justice with a view to developing experimental
paradigms for agents that do not possess human conceptual and linguistic abilities.
In other words, this research has doubtlessly the potential to inform the
philosophical debate on justice. But it also has cultural effects that go beyond the
academic debates in, e.g., anthropology, moral psychology, or ethical theories about
the ‘‘foundations’’ of human morality. Books like The Age of Empathy: Nature’s
Lessons for a Kinder Society (de Waal 2009) or Braintrust. What Neuroscience Tells
us about Morality (Churchland 2011) target a broad audience with a specific
message—namely, that being ‘‘good’’ is part of human nature. As the notion of what
‘‘good’’ actually means in these contexts can be rather controversial, it is of interest
to reflect on the potential effects of such claims on our ordinary understanding of
justice and on potential errors.
We detect at least two issues in that respect. The first is the understanding of
justice that is promoted using this research: Given the methodological constraints of
working with animals, experiments rely on equality as normative goal; e.g., in the
mini-ultimatum game with chimpanzees, an ‘‘unfair’’ distribution is treated as an
unequal one. As a result, there is the danger—less in the philosophical discussion
than in the public discourse that is triggered by such research—of reducing the
notion of justice to a very simple concept of distributive justice in local interactions.
This may be in line with the present political discussion on global inequalities,
promoting a normative goal that ‘‘everyone should get the same’’ (e.g., with respect
to a person’s ecological footprint). This simple notion of justice may, however, not
reflect the complexity of current distribution problems occurring within the large-
scale cooperation of (partly) anonymous institutions.
The second point refers to the rationale for justice—namely, as an instrument for
maintaining cooperation. The reasoning behind many evolutionary approaches to
justice runs as follows: Justice in small-scale groups is a normative and motivational
force which sustains cooperation within this group; and justice in small groups is
often a matter of equality (Bowles and Gintis 2011). Accordingly, inequalities in a
society undermine cooperation, and this is a reason to promote an equality-based
understanding of justice. But this reasoning is inconclusive. It assumes that
cooperation including all members is actually needed to establish and maintain a
working society. This assumption may not always hold. Poverty often involves
exclusion of sizeable minorities whose integration into the cooperation processes of
a society is actually not needed from a functional point of view (these sub-cultures
will then create their own networks of cooperation). Indeed, cooperation may even
run more smoothly by excluding some minorities. As a result, cooperation cannot be
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invoked to justify inclusion of and justice toward such minorities. And regarding
cooperation and harmony as the ultimate rationale for justice may have morally
unacceptable consequences, namely of giving succor to exclusionary and inequi-
table policies.
This article has dealt exclusively with animals as subjects rather than objects of
morality. The topic was whether animals are themselves capable of a sense of
justice, rather than what justice demands from our treatment of animals. The two
issues are intimately linked by an important philosophical tradition, namely
contractualism. According to contractualists, the basis of morality in general and
justice in particular is provided by an actual or potential agreement between equals.
This suggests that we owe justice only to creatures that can reciprocate, and hence,
on standard differentialist assumptions, to animals. Rawls came close to accepting
this conclusion (1971, p. 512), and others have endorsed it wholeheartedly (e.g.,
Carruthers 1992, pp. 96–97).
Now, contractualism may be right to regard human interaction as the
foundation of morality. And it may also be right to insist that certain aspects of
morality apply only to creatures with whom we can interact cognitively, morally,
and emotionally. But it errs in holding that this interaction must take the form of
entering into some kind of agreement that is either explicit or at least explicable.
And it also errs in assuming that this interaction must always be fully reciprocal.
Finally, it is misguided to think that only creatures capable of some kind of
interaction can be beneficiaries of moral consideration at all. Moral value can be
an intrinsic feature of a creature, while nonetheless being a matter of degree (see
Glock 2012b). Applying this to one of the results of the research on animal
justice, we find the following: If primates do not display other-regarding inequity
aversion, this disqualifies them from possessing a bona fide sense of fairness or
justice, and exempts them from normative expectations to behave in a just
manner toward others that would go along with possessing such a sense. Still,
the fact that they do display self-regarding inequity aversion entails among other
things that—everything else being equal—we should not treat them in an
inequitable manner, i.e., treat different individuals unequally without due cause.
That injunction remains in place even if the consequence of violating it is
‘‘only’’ frustration, envy, and resentment rather than a sense of righteous
indignation.
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